Yukihiro Nobuhara

Qualifications:

PhD, the University of Tokyo, 2000. Title of Thesis Naturalizing the Mind (in Japanese)

BA, the University of Tokyo, 1977

Employment:

2008 - Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo

1995-2008 Associate Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo

Current Research Interests:

Philosophical psychology, Neuroethics, Neuroliteracy.

Books:

2002. Philosophy of Consciousness: How to Naturalize Qualia, Iwanamishoten (in Japanese).

2000. A Connectionist View of Mind, Koudansha (in Japanese).

1999. Naturalizing the Mind, Keisoshobo (in Japanese).

Responsibility and Self-control

Yukihiro Nobuhara

Philosophy Department

University of Tokyo

   There are a variety of ways we lose self-control. Here I focus on one interesting case of loss of self-control: hijacking of belief by desire. Belief should reflect a fact so that in order to form a rational belief, we should form a belief independently of our desires. But sometimes the process of belief formation is affected by desires. In particular it is sometimes affected by desires when we are forming evaluative beliefs. Evaluative belief should reflect a fact about value. It should not be distorted by desires. However, the desire formation process sometimes hijacks the belief formation process unconsciously. In this case we form an evaluative belief which does not correspond to a value but rather to a desire. We are forced to form the evaluative belief which justifies the desire ex post. I explore in what respects we lose self-control in the case of hijacking and whether we are responsible for an action resulting from the hijacking. Obviously we fail to control the belief formation process. But I argue that we also fail to control the desire formation process. Desire should be formed in accordance with an evaluative belief or if it is formed otherwise, it should be adjusted so as to accord with a corresponding evaluative belief. Rationality of desire requires it. Finally I argue that we are responsible for an action in the hijacking case if we have the capacity for self-control but fail to exercise it.